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In the 
SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 
7249 
In the matter of the estate of Anna D. Walton, deceased. 
BRIEF O·F RESPON·DENT 
At pp. 16 and 17 of appellant brief the commission 
method of computation appears. Reference to stipulation 
of facts (Rec. 62) discloses that the net estate is $25,-
444.77 and not $26,983.93, and see appellants brief p. 5, 
para. 5. 
The executrix, Elizabeth M. Jerrell, and the State 
Tax Commission have by stipulation fi'led herein agreed 
upon the submission of a controversy without action for 
the purpose of obtaining a declaratory, and final judg-
ment as to the meaning and application of the present 
inheritance tax statute. 
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The testatrix, Anna D. Walton, had five children;-
three daughters, to each of whom was bequea;thed an 
undivided one-fifth of the estate; Thomas D. Walton, a 
son, who died in 1940, leaving four children, to each of 
which children is bequeathed an undivided one-twentieth 
of the estate; a son, Franklin ·G. Walton, to whom bene-
ficially is bequeathed a life estate with remainder over 
to his children. This one-fifth of the estate is in trust to 
E. A. Walton, et aL, as trustees. 
The principal questions are: First, does the word 
''children'' include grandchildren of the testatrix. If it 
does then it is not claimed that there is any tax liability 
here, either in respect of Thomas' children or Franklin's 
children. 
Secondly, if the term ''children'' does not include 
grandchildren of the testatrix then should the tax be ap-
plied as to the Franklin one-fifth upon his life estate as 
well as upon the remainder to his children. 
'Thirdly, if the executrix be wrong in her p~rincipal 
and first contention, then should the exemptions with 
respect to the part going to the children begin at one 
dollar or at ten thousand and one dollars. 
BRIEF AND ARG U!iENT 
I 
IN SUC'H A STATUTE CHILDREN INCLUDES 
GRAND·CHILDREN. 
It will not be disputed that in resp2ct of wills the 
general rule is that if it appears that the intention of tlu~ 
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3 
testator makes it manifest that grandchildren were in-
tended to be included such intention will be given effect. 
The authorities seem unanimous upon this point. Pa$sim. 
In statutes usually as we have been .able to discover 
about t\vo thirds of the jurisdictions are our way and 
about one-third are apparently, or superficially as to 
some of the cases, seem against us. 
It is our contention that the equity, reason, justice, 
and weight of authority sup·port our position. 
Prior to the amendment of 1947 there was no dis-
crimination between direct and collateral heirs, and this 
amendment as indicated by the title, and the Ianguage of 
the statute itself is manifestly designed to bring our sys-
tem into line in a general way, not only with the Federal 
Statute but practically all of the other jurisdictions, State 
and Territorial, making up the American Union, nearly 
all of which both as to rate of tax and amount of exemp~-·; 
tion discriminate sharply between lineals and collaterals. 
The same discrimination between lineals and colla-
terals, including of course spouses with lineals, is found 
in the common law and in all the statutes of descent in 
the various jurisdictions of the United States, and as was 
held in the Cupples case in Missouri, 199 S.W. 556, the 
inheritance tax or state tax statutes are to he construed 
in light of descent statutes. 
In Kyle v. Kyle, 18 Indiana, 108, a section of the act 
concerning descents provided, ''If a husband or wife dies 
intestate, leaving no children and no father or mother, the 
whole of his property ... shall go to the survivors.'' 
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The court held that the gener,al itntent exhibited in 
the descent statutes to take care of descendants required 
a holding that the term child includes grandchildren . 
. In Eshleman's Appeal, 74 Pa. 42, the statute dealt 
with advances to a ''child.'' The court held that such in-
cluded advances to a grandchild whose father was dead. 
The Court cited many cases and said: ''When the ex-
pression in. a statute is special or pHrticular but the 
reason is general, the expression should be deemed gen-
eral." 
To the same effect is Storey's Appeal, 83 Pa. 89, 96. 
In Morin v. Holliday (Ind. Ap.) 77 N.E. 61, the court 
held that the words, "illegitimate child or children" in 
a statute of inheritance includes grandchildren. 
In Scott v. Silvers, 64 Ind. 76-78, it is held that in a 
statute of descent the words, "children alive',- must be 
held to mean 'children or their descendants alive'." 
These cases were followed in Davis v. Thompson, 179 
Ind. 539, 101 N .E. 108. 
In Starret v. McKim, 90 Ark. 520, 119· S.W. 824, the 
court held that in a statute of descent the word "chil-
dren'' includes descendants in any degree. 
In Phillips v. Lawing, 150 Ala. 186, 43 So. 494, the 
court held that the words "child or children'' in a descent 
statute mean "a child or children represented in the dis-
tribution of the estate whether living or represented by 
descendants," "where such interpretation is required hy 
reason and justice.'' 
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In Kaha,vanui v. Mannakea, 20 Hawaii, 114, the word 
"children" in a descent statute is held to include "grand-
children. ' ' 
The court approved Walton v. Cotton, 60 U.S. 355, 
which held that in a pension act using the word '' chil-
dren,'' ''grandchildren'' are included in the equity of the 
statute. 
In Cutting v. Cutting, 6 F. 259, the court had before 
it the construction of the word ''children'' in a donation 
act of Congress and, holding that the word includes chil-
dren of a deceased child, said : ' ' The children of the de-
ceased child of Charles Cutting are certainly within the 
equity of the statute. 
In Keeney v. McVoy, 206 Mo. 42, 1035 S.W. 946, the 
above line of authorities was ap~proved and followed. 
In Walton v. Cotton, 19 How. 355, 15 L. Ed. 659, the 
syllabus, which reflects exactly the court's holding is, 
":The word 'children' in the Pension Acts ... embraces 
the grandchildren of the deceased pensioner whether 
their parents died before or after his decease.'' 
In re Cup·ples ·Estate, 272 Mo. 465, 199 S.W. 556 
involved inheritance tax exemption. There was no tax as 
to children whether by blood or adoption nor as to lineal 
descendant of testator. It was claimed by the revenue col-
lector that a child of the deceased's adopted child was 
not within the category of persons as to whom the tax: 
did not apply. The court affirmed the judgment against 
the collector, holding that construction of the inheritance 
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tax statute should he controlled by the general policy ex-
hibited by the statutes of descents, and that the child of 
the adopted child was (though not so literally) included 
as a child or descendant of the testator. The Court said, 
"The word 'children' may whenever reason requires it 
be construed to include their descendants.'' 
To same effect are Estate of Winchester, 140 Cal. 
469, 7 4 P. 10. Succession of Vives, 35 La. Ann. 371; In 
re Williams, 62 Mo. App. 339; Bee he v. Estabrook, 79 
N.Y. 246, 250. 
In the last case the court said that in conformity 
with the general spirit and design of the descent statutes 
and of cognate provisions the general principle is ''that 
there shall he equality between the children of the in-
testate (deceased) and the descendants of deceased chil-
dren per stirpes, hence the word 'children' includes 
grandchildren or descendants.'' The Court further said 
that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together 
and it would be assumed that the legislature intended a 
harmonious system. 
We submit there is no harmony in a system that 
penalizes both the children of a deceased, and orphan 
grandchildren by putting the orphan grandchildren in 
a class with the most remote of collateral kindred. 
See also 3 Restatement of the Law of Property, Sec. 
285 ( 2) (a) (b) (d). 
As we have said, nearly aH the jurisdictions have by 
their estate or inheritance tax statutes favored lineals, 
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especially lineal deseendants, and a great many of them 
fayor them both as to rates and as to exemptions. 
See the following statutes: Code of Alabama 1940; 
Title 51; Second Digest of Arkansas Statutes 19'3'7, page 
3450; Dee rings California General Rues 1937, Act. 8495; 
Third Colorado Statutes Ann. 1935, p·age 575, 6; General 
Statutes Connecticut, Section 1366; Delaware Revised 
Code 1935; pages 34 and 35; Florida Statutes 1941, 
Chapter 198; Code of Georgia Title, 92; R·evise·d Law 
Hawaii, 1945, Sec. 5555; 1 Ada. Court Ann. 1932, Sec. 
14-405, 14-407; Extra Session of 1935, Chap. 56, 120 
Smith-Hurd Ann. Statutes, 120-375; Baldwin Ind. Sta-
tutes 1934, Sec. 15940; 1 Code of Iowa 1946, Sec. 450.9; 
450.10; General Statutes 1939, Sec. 8556; Baldwin's Ky. 
Revised Statutes 1942, Sec. 140.070, 140.080; 2 Revised 
Statutes Main 1944, Chap. 142; Ann. Code Amended 19'39, 
Article 81, Sec. 109, 110; Second Ann. Laws Mass., Chap. 
65; 1 Minn. Statutes 1945, Sec. 291.03, 291.05; 1 Mo. Re-
vised Statutes of 1939, Sec. 573; 3 Mont. Revised Codes 
1931, Sec. 10378; 4 Neb. Revised Statutes, Sec. 77-2004; 
1 Revised Laws N.H. 1943, page 349; 2 N.M. Statutes 
1941, Sec. 34-102; 2 Revised Statutes N.J. 1937, Sec. 54, 
34-2; N.C. Code 1939, ·sec. 78, 80 (3); 5 No. Dakota Re-
vised Code 1943, 57-3711; 4 A Publications Ohio General 
Code, Sec. 5334, 5335; 2 Oregon Compiled Laws 1940, 
Sec. 20-105; Oklahoma Statutes Ann. 68, Sec. 989 G; Pur-
dons Pa. Statutes 1936, 'Title 72; General La,vs Rhode 
Island 38, Chap. 43, Sec. 7 and 8; 2 Code of Laws So. 
Calif. 1942, Sec. 2480; ·Compiled Laws North Dakota 
1929, Sec. 6830; Second Williams Tennessee Code, Sec. 
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1266, 1267; 28 Vernons Texas Civil .Statutes, Article 
7118-7122; Public Laws Vt. 1933, Sec. 1048, 1049; Va. 
Code 1942~ page 2.662; Remington Revised Statutes 
Washington. 1940, · pocket part page 183, W. V a. Code 
1943, Sec. 843, 845; Wisconsin Statutes 1945, 72.02, 72.04. 
We ref.er to the above as illustrative of the universal 
re.cognition. in English and American Law of the equity 
and justice of treating lineal descendants as a distinct 
and preferred class and as tending to show that the 
legislature did not intend to put grandchildren or other 
lineal descendants in the same category ,as collateral 
kindred. The po'licy of favoring lineals in descent statutes 
is shown emphatically by our non-lapse statute, S.ec. 101-
1-35 U.C.A., which p~rovides that where a legatee pre-
deceases the testator the legacy will go to the lineal de-
sc.endants. 
''One of the cardinal principles of statutory con-
struction is that the court will look to the reason, spirit 
and sense of the legislation as indicated by the entire con-
text and sub1ject matter dealing with the subject.'' 
Masich v. U. ·s. Smelting Co. (Utah), 191 
P. 2d. 612. 
Ml parts of a statute must be subservi·ent to the 
general intent of the statute. 
Crawford Construction of Statutes, Sec. 202. 
State v. Franklin, 63 Utah 442, 22·6· P. 674. 
Inheritance tax statutes should be construed against 
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The whole of the taxing statute, including that part 
relating to exemptions should he construed strictly 
against the state. 
People v. Snyder, 353 Ill. 184, 18 N.E. 158, 88 
A.L.R. 101'2 and note. · 
II 
IN NO EVENT IS IT PR!OPER TO TREAT THE FRANK-
LIN WALTON LIFE ESTATE AS N~OT EXEMPT. 
As the one-fifth going to Franklin G. Walton and 
children consists of a life estate and a remainder certain-
ly the life estate goes to a ·child in the first degree. 
Each estate should be valued by using morta'lity 
tables, etc., and this is true whether the statute so pro-
vides or not. 
Ithaca Trust Company v. U. S., 279 U. S. 151, 
73 L. Ed. 647. 
See also cas.es cited in 127 America State Reports, 
page 1076. 
III 
THE FIRST $10,000 IS. N:OT TAXED AT ALL. 
There is no attemp~t in our statute to tax any part of 
the first $10,000.00 of an estate. Consequently one should 
start the exemption that is provided by the statute at just 
over ten thousand dollars. 
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Let us take an estate of ex.actly ten thousand dollars 
where all of it by will or descent statutes goes to col-
laterals. We understand that the p·ractice is not to tax 
it at all. (Record 62.) .But, suppose the estate is ten thous-
and one hundred dollars, ten thousand dollars going to 
collaterals and one hundred dollars going to a husband, 
wife, or child. Literally, under the present statute, the 
exemption would be one hundred doHars and only that, 
all of which results in an absurdity. 
As the tax begins at $10,000,, so also sh!ould the ex~, 
ception ·exempting the favored spouse and lineals begin at 
the same point. 
We submit that the construction heretofore made by 
the comm_ission that the first $10,000 is not taxable nor 
taxed at all is .correct, and that the exemption provided 
begins exactly at the point and amount where the tax; 
begins. 
Otherwise, the exception to the rule is broader than 
the rule its-elf which is impossible and absurd. 
Here the Commission concedes an ·exemption as to 
three-fifths of the estate· 1(about $15,000), but it wants 
$10,000 of that !exemption satisfied out of something 
against which no tax is asserted hy the statute. 
I 
IV 
APPELLANT',S AUTHORITIES 
Counsel for T·ax Commission cites 61 C.J. 1611 and 
in Re; McKennans Est. (S.D.) 130 N.W. 33, holding the 
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legislature has constitutional power to classify, we do 
not contend otherwise. If the legislature here had ex-
plicitly named grandchildren and so put them in a class 
outside "children" that would perhaps end the matter 
and there \Vould be no need for interpretation or con-
struction. However, the case cited says the power is 
limited, and does not extend to '·'an unnatural plan." 
We submit that to construe "chHdren" to exclude 
"grandchildren" and so to put grandchildren into the 
same class as third and fourth cousins exhibits a wholly 
''unnatural plan.'' 
Counsel says ''The law seems to be well settled.'' 
(His way, of course, he means.) Let us examine his cases: 
In Re O'Connors Will, 251 N.Y.S., 686 holds that the 
daughter of a deceased step·son is not included in the 
term ''child.'' However, if the case is thought to be 
against us it is in conf,lict with the court of appeals 
case of Beebe v. Estabrook, 79 N.Y. 246. 
~IcQueen v. Stephens (Tex.), 100 S.W. 2d 1053 is 
a will ease, involving meaning of word child in the p·re-
termission statute and it appeared that the intention of 
the testator was not to include the grandchild 'vhose 
mother was intentionally pretermitted. It is quite obvi-
ous that the word '·'child" in such statute would have 
the narrower meaning. 
In Re Curry's Estate, 39 Cal. 529 is cited. The opin-
ion emphasises the fact that the holding that the \vord 
''child'' does not include ''grandchildren'' applies to 
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12 
children of collaterals, not to direct descendants, a very 
different case in the reason and justice of the matter. 
Hoggatt v. Clapton, Tenn., 217 S.W. 657, is a will 
case and the court very properly held that whether ''chil-
dren'' includes grandchildren or not is a question of 
intention of the testator. The Court noted especially that 
the testa tor had used the expression as to one devisee 
''children or grandchildren'' and as to another only the 
word 'children' and treated such differentiation as very 
important. 
Falter v. Walker (Okla.), 149 P. 1111 holds as coun-
sel claim. The rule was there applied to ·exclude not a 
grandchild of deceased, but a grand nephew---1a collateral. 
The Court there cited and followed the California Court 
in the R~e Curry's Estate, 3'9 Cal. 529. 
Walgren v. Taylor (W. Va.), 45 S.E. 336 does not 
decide the point. The question was one of advancement 
and whether the doctrine of- '' hotch pot'' applied. The 
statute said 'descendant' and the Court held that a col-
lateral relative is not a descendant. 
Carter v. Carter (Ky.), 270 S.W. 7'60 is a will case. 
The Court held that the term '~children'' included grand-
children. However, the Court based its holding in part 
on the no lapse statute and a'lso a statute providing that 
''a devise to children embraces grandchildren when 
there are no children, etc.'' Finally the Court said that 
from the circumstances the intention of the testator was 
clear to include the grandchildren. 
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The case is not in point for the commission. There 
are therefore hardly four jurisdictions that seem to sup-
port counsels claims as against about eight in our favor. 
It is not what the word ''children" generally con-
notes, but what meaning should be ascribed under des-
cent statutes and in circumstances where reason and 
justice indicate a broader meaning. 
v 
THE LIFE ESTATE IS PROPERTY 1GOING T·O F. G. 
WALTON. 
Counsel make the point that ours is an estate tax 
rather than an inheritance tax. We are unable to see the 
relevancy of this claim. Also, our Court has said that 
it is immaterial what one calls it, and not important to 
so classify. 
State Tax Commission v. Backman, 88 Utah 424, 55 
P. 2d 171. 
In Re Walker's Estate, 100 Utah 307, 114 P. 2d 1030. 
We have difficulty in following counsel's atte1npt to 
distinguish the Ithaca Case from this case because there 
the Court explicitly held that the value of the life estate 
to the widow was separate from the remainder and should 
he valued separately. 
Counsel seems to think that it is material to consider 
to whom the remainder goes-whether to relatives or to 
charity, and to consider on this question, the matter of 
exemption as applied to the remainder. 
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Counsel-cites Re Clark (Mont.), 114 A.L~R. 496 which 
deals with retrospective tax statute and the distinction 
between real and personal property in its devolution, but 
so far as we c.an see does not touch any question here in-
volved. 
In Baily v. Drane (96 Tenn.), 16, 33 S.W. 573. There 
was a life estate in trust for benefit of the mother of 
testator (The brother was in a p·referred or exempted 
class) . Remainder was to one not in the exempted class. 
This remainder was held taxable and the life estate not 
taxable. 
The judgment should he affirmed. 
E. A. WALTON, 
.Attorney fo.r Resp,ondent 
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